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Abstract. We study the nature of the relationship between performance
measures and privacy guarantees in the case study of an adaptive pro-
tocol for the secure transmission of real-time audio over the Internet.
The analysis is conducted on a process-algebraic description of the audio
mechanism by following a methodology that allows the modeler to (i)
employ the noninterference approach to information ﬂow theory for the
analysis of security requirements, and (ii) derive performance measures
obtained through markovian analysis techniques. The main result we
present is that the analysis of performance properties helps to estimate
the eﬀectiveness (and to ﬁnd a related countermove) of an attack that is
captured by the security analysis.
1 Introduction
The analysis of Quality of Service (QoS) properties and of security conditions are
two important problems that arise in the modeling phase of computer systems,
especially when dealing with applications working over public, untrusted net-
works and with strict functional and performance requirements [SDS01]. In this
paper, we focus on the potential relationship between these two aspects in the
context of a protocol for audio communications over IP, developed in a software
tool called BoAT [RGPSB01,AGR01,AMR03,AGR03]. We chose this case study
because the success of voice over IP services strictly depends on their capabil-
ity of coping with unforeseeable environment constraints, typical of public wide
area networks, such as variable queueing delays, packet loss, and lack of secu-
rity guarantees. In particular, BoAT aims at providing an audio quality that is
comparable to that of the circuit-switched telephone system, and a security level
comparable to that of a private channel, by following two main strategies. On the
one hand, BoAT employs a mechanism that adaptively adjusts the playout of the
received audio packets to the ﬂuctuating network delays in order to oﬀer at the
receiving site the same audio quality as that produced at the sending site under
any scenario. The core of such a mechanism is represented by a handshaking
protocol, which is used to exchange estimations of the traﬃc conditions betweenthe involved parties. A simulative comparison between this novel mechanism and
other existing adaptive algorithms revealed that BoAT succeeds in oﬀering an
adequate QoS [ABGR01]. On the other hand, BoAT employs a cryptographic
protocol, which adopts a lightweight securing mechanism based on the use of
a stream cipher (see, e.g., [Schn96]) and of a sequence of secret keys needed to
secure the conversation. The brief lifetime of each secret key (which is exchanged
in the same handshaking packets used by the adaptive playout algorithm and is
used by the stream cipher to encrypt few hundreds of bytes only) is the main
feature of BoAT that strengthens the robustness of the cryptographic algorithm
against cryptanalysis attacks. Moreover, as experimental studies have empha-
sized [AGR01,AGR03], such an approach suﬀers a computational overhead that
is quite negligible with respect to other securing tools proposed in the literature.
The formal analysis we conduct in this paper aims at studying the eﬀective-
ness of the securing mechanism of BoAT in the light of the considerations above.
The results we obtain have a twofold interest. On the one hand, the security anal-
ysis reveals an attack by an adversary that tries to intercept all the handshaking
packets containing the secret keys, thus blocking the re-keying mechanism. On
the other hand, the performance analysis shows that the throughput of the play-
out control algorithm, expressed in terms of number of audio packets delivered
(and played out) per sec, and the throughput of the privacy infrastructure, ex-
pressed in terms of number of secret keys exchanged per sec, are strictly coupled.
In particular, by analyzing the relation between these two measures, we can es-
timate the privacy level of the system and possibly detect the attack described
above. Moreover, it is worth noting that the results of the same formal analysis
help not only to reveal the weaknesses of the audio protocol but also to single
out and evaluate a strategy that makes it vain the attack of the adversary.
The study is conducted on a formal description of BoAT expressed in a proba-
bilistic process algebra [BA03]. Timed, probabilistic, and stochastic extensions of
process algebras (see, e.g., [HHHMR94,HS95,BDG98]) have been introduced that
formally describe both functional and performance aspects on the same system
model, in order to bridge the gap between formal veriﬁcation and quantitative
validation. In this setting, the novelty of our approach is that both performance
related properties and information ﬂow security properties can be evaluated on
the same system model. From a performance standpoint, we can derive a Dis-
crete Time Markov Chain from the algebraic speciﬁcation of BoAT and then we
can evaluate steady-state based performance measures (expressible by attach-
ing rewards to actions) through markovian analysis techniques [Ber99]. Such an
analysis is automatically conducted with the software tool TwoTowers [BCSS98].
From a security viewpoint, the same system model is analyzed by employing a
probabilistic extension [ABG02] of the noninterference approach [GM82,FG95]
to the information ﬂow theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we brieﬂy recall
BoAT and its main features. In Sect. 3, we describe the probabilistic process-
algebraic framework based on which we conduct the analysis. Then, in Sect. 4 we
present the algebraic speciﬁcation of BoAT and we report on the results obtainedby analyzing such a model. Finally, in Sect. 5 some conclusions terminate the
paper.
2 A Secure Real-time Audio Protocol: BoAT
In this section, we brieﬂy describe BoAT, an adaptive protocol proposed for the
trusted, private transmission of real-time audio over public networks like the
Internet [RGPSB01,AGR01,AMR03,AGR03].
On the one hand, BoAT provides an adaptive control mechanism that sup-
ports quality guarantees of Internet voice software in spite of highly ﬂuctuant
transmission delay variation and packet loss. The goal of providing a synchronous
playout of audio packets at the receiving site is typically achieved by buﬀering
the received audio packets and by delaying their playout time in order to compen-
sate for variable network delays. With respect to other adaptive audio algorithms
(see, e.g., [Schu92,HSK98]), BoAT dynamically adapts the playout delays to the
network traﬃc conditions assuming neither the existence of an external mecha-
nism for maintaining an accurate clock synchronization between the sender and
the receiver, nor a speciﬁc distribution of the end-to-end transmission delays
experienced by the audio packets.
On the other hand, BoAT embodies a privacy infrastructure that provides
authentication of the two involved parties, secrecy and integrity of the protocol
data and of the audio conversation. This is obtained with a minimal per-packet
communication overhead that does not jeopardize the performance guaranteed
by the adaptive playout mechanism.
Succinctly, the core of the mechanism of BoAT is based on a three way
handshake protocol periodically performed during the conversation between the
sender and the receiver. Thanks to such a packet exchange, usually performed
once a second, the two parties obtain (i) an estimation (called ¢) of the upper
bound for the packet transmission delay experienced during the audio communi-
cation, and (ii) a new secret key used to secure the conversation.
A correct estimation of ¢ represents the key factor for the success of the
playout control mechanism. Indeed, ¢ directly inﬂuences the talkspurt playout
delay, which is dynamically set at the receiving site from one talkspurt to the
next one on the basis of the result of the handshaking phase. A description of
such a mechanism is as follows. The sender begins the synchronization policy by
sending a probe packet timestamped with the time value ts shown by its own
clock. At the reception of this packet, the receiver sets its own clock to ts and
sends immediately back a response packet timestamped with the same value ts.
Upon receiving the response packet, the sender checks if it is related to the last
probe message sent to the receiver and, in such a case, computes the value of the
round trip time (RTT) by subtracting the value of the timestamp ts from the
current value of its local clock. At that moment, the diﬀerence between the sender
clock and the receiver clock is equal to an unknown quantity (say t0), which may
range from a theoretical lower bound of 0 (i.e., all the RTT has been consumed
on the way back from the receiver to the sender), and a theoretical upper boundof RTT (i.e., all the RTT has been consumed during the transmission of the
probe packet). The ﬁnal packet of the handshaking phase sent by the sender to
the receiver is an installation packet, with attached the calculated RTT value
and the timestamp ts. Upon receiving this packet, the receiver sets the time of
its local clock, by subtracting from the current value of its local clock the value
of the transmitted RTT. At that moment, the diﬀerence between the sender
clock and the receiver clock is equal to a value given by ¢ = t0 + RTT, where
¢ ranges in the interval [RTT;2 £ RTT], depending on the unknown value of
t0, that in turn may range in the interval [0;RTT]. Usually, the installation of
a new clock value at the receiving site does not occur during a talkspurt since
it may artiﬁcially alter the comprehension of the conversation. Therefore, the
install message is not sent as soon as the response packet is received; instead, it
is sent during a silence period. Finally, the last step of the handshaking protocol
is given by the transmission of a timestamped acknowledgement packet from
the receiver to the sender. At the end of the protocol, the diﬀerence between the
sender clock and the receiver clock represents the estimate of an upper bound for
the transmission delay that is used to dynamically adjust the playout delay and
the buﬀer size. In particular, each audio packet is timestamped with the value
of the sender clock at its generation instant, and such a value also represents
the playout instant that must be scheduled by the receiver. Hence, a maximum
transmission delay equal to the diﬀerence between the two clocks is left to each
audio packet to arrive at the receiver in time for its playout. The reader interested
in more details and proofs concerning this adaptive playout control mechanism
should refer to [RGPSB01,ABGR01].
The other goal of the handshaking protocol is to provide privacy of the audio
communication. This is done as follows. A preliminary authentication phase is
carried out by the two parties before the conversation (e.g., by resorting to a
digital signature scheme). During this step, the trusted parties agree on a se-
cret key, which is used to encrypt the packet exchange of a ﬁrst handshaking
phase that precedes the audio communication. Then, during each handshaking
phase i, the authenticated parties agree on a session key Ki (e.g., exchanged
in the install packet). Whenever the three-way handshake has a positive out-
come, Ki is the session key used by a stream cipher to secure the subsequent
chunk of conversation. Since the handshaking protocol is periodically started
during the conversation, a sequence of keys fKigi2N I is generated, where each
key has a lifetime equal to the time between two consecutive synchronizations.
Details related to such a protocol and to the securing algorithm can be found
in [AGR01,AGR03].
Summing up, the synchronization policy is periodically repeated throughout
the whole conversation. In particular, in order for the proposed policy to adap-
tively adjust to the highly ﬂuctuant network conditions, the above mentioned
synchronization technique is ﬁrst carried out prior to the beginning of the con-
versation, and then repeated about once a second thus preventing the two clocks
(possibly equipped with diﬀerent clock rates) from drifting apart. The proposed
protocol guarantees that (i) both playout delay and buﬀer size are always pro-portioned to the traﬃc conditions, and (ii) the brief lifetime of each session key
makes it harder any cryptanalysis attack conducted by an adversary (see, e.g.,
[BSW00], where it is shown that a few seconds of conversation are enough to
complete a cryptanalysis attack against a stream cipher).
3 A Process-algebraic Framework
3.1 The Probabilistic Calculus
Basic process algebras (and their extensions) are speciﬁcation languages used
to describe in a compositional way the behavior of concurrent systems in order
to formally derive their functional (and non-functional) properties. The basic
elements of any process algebra are the actions, which in our calculus are syn-
tactically divided into output actions and input actions, and the algebraic op-
erators, which in our calculus are equipped with probabilistic information. The
model of probabilities we adopt is a mixture of the generative and reactive ap-
proaches of [GSS95]. In particular, we assume the output actions behaving as
generative actions (a generative process autonomously decides, on the basis of a
probability distribution, which action will be executed and how to behave after
such an event) and the input actions behaving as reactive actions (a reactive
process internally reacts to the choice of the action type, say a, performed by
the environment, on the basis of a probability distribution associated with the
reactive actions of type a it can perform).
Formally, AType is the set of visible action types, ranged over by a; b;:::.
For each visible action type a, we distinguish the (generative) output action a
and the (reactive) input action a¤. The set of actions is denoted by Act, ranged
over by ¼; ¼0;:::, including the input and the output actions with type in AType,
and the special action ¿, representing the internal, unobservable action. We point
out that ¿ behaves as a generative action, because it expresses an autonomous
internal move, which does not react to external stimuli. The set L of process
terms is generated by the syntax:
P ::= 0j¼:P jP +p P jP k
p
S P jPnLjP=p
a jA
where S;L µ AType, a 2 AType, and p 2]0;1[. The set L is ranged over by
P; Q;:::. Constants A are used to specify recursive systems. In general, when
deﬁning an algebraic speciﬁcation, we assume a set of constants deﬁning equa-
tions of the form A
¢ = P to be given. In the following, we restrict ourselves to the
set of ﬁnite state, closed, guarded terms of L, which we call processes [Mil89].
As usual in security models, we distinguish among high-level visible actions
and low-level visible actions by deﬁning two disjoint sets ATypeH of high-level
types and ATypeL of low-level types, which form a covering of AType, such that
the output action a and the input action a¤ are high- (low-) level actions if
a 2 ATypeH (a 2 ATypeL). Finally, we say that P is a high-level process if
all actions syntactically occurring in the action preﬁx operators within P are
high-level actions.Now, we informally describe the semantics of the operators and the prob-
abilistic model through some examples (for a formal presentation the reader
should refer to [ABG02]).
Example 1. Let us consider the system
Writer k
p
fproduceg Buﬀer;
described as the interaction of two processes, Writer and Buﬀer. The communi-
cation interface fproduceg says that the two processes interact by synchronously
executing actions of type produce. Each other local action is asynchronously ex-
ecuted by the two processes. Probability p is the parameter of a probabilistic
scheduler that, in each system state, decides which of the two processes must be
scheduled, i.e. Writer with probability p and Buﬀer with probability 1¡p. Now,
let us detail each component in isolation. Process Writer repeatedly produces
new items:
Writer
¢ = produce:Writer +q ¿:Writer:
The alternative choice operator “ +q ” says that process Writer can either
produce a message (action produce) with probability q, or stay idle (action ¿)
with probability 1 ¡ q, and afterwards behaving as the same process Writer.
The actions produce and ¿ are generative, hence the process itself autonomously
decides, on the basis of a probability distribution guided by parameter q, which
action will be executed and how to behave after such an event (see Fig. 1(a),
showing the labeled transition system associated to process Writer in isolation).
Process Buﬀer, instead, is ready to accept new incoming items or it stays idle:
Buﬀer
¢ = (produce¤:discard:Buﬀer +r produce¤:store:Buﬀer) +r
0
¿:Buﬀer:
The two actions produce¤ are reactive, hence the process reacts internally to the
choice of the action type produce, performed by its environment, on the basis of
a probability distribution associated with the reactive actions of type produce it
can perform. Whenever the action type produce is chosen by the environment,
process Buﬀer reacts by choosing either the ﬁrst action produce¤ with probability
r and then discarding the message (action discard), or the second action produce¤
with probability 1¡r and then storing the message (action store). Alternatively,
if process Buﬀer is not accepting items from the environment, the internal action
¿ is repeatedly executed to model the idle periods of the buﬀer. The choice
between the input actions produce¤ and such an internal event is nondeterministic
(parameter r0 is not considered), because the execution of an action produce¤ is
entirely guided by the external environment (see Fig. 1(b), showing the labeled
transition system associated to process Buﬀer in isolation).
According to the considerations above, the two processes interact in the com-
posed system as follows. If process Writer decides to perform the action produce,
then process Buﬀer reacts by executing one of its produce¤ actions. In the ini-
tial state of our example (see Fig. 1(c)), the system executes a move of process
Writer with probability p: it executes either the internal move ¿ with proba-
bility p ¢ (1 ¡ q), or the move produce with probability p ¢ q (with probabilityp ¢ q ¢ r it executes a produce action synchronized with the ﬁrst reactive action
of process Buﬀer and with probability p ¢ q ¢ (1 ¡ r) a produce action synchro-
nized with the second reactive action of process Buﬀer). On the other hand, the
system may schedule with probability 1 ¡ p the process Buﬀer by executing its
internal action ¿ (that gets the entire probability 1 ¡ p associated to process
Buﬀer). Afterwards, if, e.g., the winning action is the action produce leading to
term Writer k
p
fproduceg store:Buﬀer, then the system executes either the action
store with probability 1 ¡ p, thus reaching the initial state again, or the action
¿ of process Writer (which gets the entire probability p associated to process
Writer, since it is the only generative action of the left-hand process enabled by
the system).
Example 2. Let us consider the system
Job k
q
S Scheduler;
where processes Job and Scheduler interact by synchronizing on actions in the
set S = fschedule; endg. We now detail the several components and their inter-
actions. Process Job repeatedly produces new jobs:
Job
¢ = schedule:end¤:Job:
Whenever the synchronizing generative action schedule is executed, which mod-
els a new job passed to the scheduler component, process Job waits for the
termination of the job, which is signalled via a synchronization through the re-
active action end¤, and then behaves as the same process Job. Term Scheduler
is in turn composed of two communicating processes:
Scheduler
¢ = (Fetch k
q
0
fpassg Exec)=p
pass
which model a pipeline whose components sequentially execute the received job:
Fetch
¢ = schedule¤:¿:pass:Fetch
store, 1−p
p
1−p discard,
p
produce, produce,pqr
p(1−q) + (1−p)
produce, q
1−q
produce , 1−r
discard store
produce , r
pq(1−r) 
{produce}
p
t, 
t, 
t,  t, 
*
t 
*
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Fig.1. Labeled transition systems associated to diﬀerent process terms. Transitions
are labeled with an action and a probability, which is equal to 1 if omitted.fetches a new job (action schedule¤), does an internal computation, and then
passes the control (action pass) to term
Exec
¢ = pass¤:¿:end:Exec;
which in turn does some internal computation and then communicates the result
by synchronizing with process Job (action end). The hiding operator “ =p
pass”
turns the action pass, resulting from the synchronization between processes Fetch
and Exec, into the action ¿. This is because the activity modeled by the action
pass represents an internal computation of term Scheduler, which should not be
observable by an external component like process Job.
In the initial state of our example, the synchronizing action schedule (express-
ing the communication between processes Job and Fetch) is the only generative
action executable by the system, therefore it gets the entire probability 1 to be
performed. Moreover, note that process Exec is blocked since the action pass¤
cannot synchronize. By following the same considerations, we then execute a
sequence of ¿ actions representing the computations of term Scheduler, followed
by the action end leading to the initial state again (see Fig. 2(a)). As a conse-
quence, since probabilistic choices among concurrent processes are never to be
performed, parameters q and q0, which guide the probabilistic parallel execution
of processes Job, Fetch, and Exec, never come into play. Moreover, parameter
p is not meaningful (we will shortly explain its use). Now, let us assume that
a malfunction prevents the scheduler from informing process Job that the cur-
rent job has been completed. This behavior can be modeled with the restriction
operator “ nL” by changing the system as follows:
Job k
q
S(Schedulernfendg);
where term Scheduler is prevented from executing actions of type end. Therefore,
in term end¤:Job k
q
S(((Fetch k
q
0
fpassg end:Exec)=p
pass)nfendg), which is reachable
from the initial state by executing the sequence of actions schedule ¿ ¿ ¿, the
synchronization on the action of type end is not enabled. Since the composed
system does not enable other actions that can get the probability of the restricted
action end, the system deadlocks with probability 1 (see Fig. 2(b)).
Job k
q
S((Fetch k
q0
fpassg Exec)=
p
fpassg) Job k
q
S(((Fetch k
q0
fpassg Exec)=
p
fpassg)nfendg)
schedule
end
schedule t t t t t t
(a) (b)
Fig.2. Labeled transition systems associated to the models of Example 2.The two examples above put in evidence some features of our probabilistic
calculus.
As far as the CSP-like communication policy is concerned, in any binary syn-
chronization at most one generative action can be involved and, in such a case,
the result is a generative action of the same type. Instead, in case two reactive
actions of type a synchronize, then the result is again a reactive action of type
a. We recall that the actions belonging to the communication interface are con-
strained to synchronize, while all the other actions are locally and independently
executed by the processes that compose the system.
As far as the probabilistic model is concerned, the following comments are
in order. Probabilistic choices among generative actions (among reactive actions
of the same type) are fully probabilistic, while in each other case the choice is
completely nondeterministic. This is essentially due to the fact that the reactive
actions are underspeciﬁed since they are guided by the environment behavior.
As a consequence, the parameters that probabilistically guide the choices come
into play if and only if a probabilistic choice is really to be performed. Some
further details are in order in case of the parallel operator P k
p
S Q:
– since the execution of some generative actions of P can be prevented in
P k
p
S Q (PnL), the probabilities of executing the remaining generative actions
of P are proportionally redistributed (similarly for Q), as shown both in
Example 1 and in Example 2 (note that this is a standard approach when
restricting actions in the generative model [GSS95]);
– in case of synchronizing generative actions a of P, their probability is dis-
tributed among the multiple actions a obtained by synchronizing with reac-
tive actions a¤ executable by Q, according to the probability the actions a¤
are chosen in Q (symmetrically for Q), as shown in Example 1;
– in case both P and Q can execute some synchronizing actions a¤ 2 S, then
P k
p
S Q can execute some actions a¤: the probability of each action a¤ exe-
cutable by P k
p
S Q is the product of the probabilities of the two actions a¤
(one of P and one of Q) that are involved in the synchronization.
We point out that in each system state of a process term, the sum of the proba-
bilities of the generative actions (reactive actions of a given type a), if there are
any, is always equal to 1.
A ﬁnal remark is in order for the hiding operator P=p
a, which turns reac-
tive and generative actions of type a into ¿ actions. Parameter p expresses the
probability that actions ¿ obtained by hiding actions a¤ of P are executed with
respect to the generative actions previously enabled by P. Hence, p guarantees
that the hiding operator does not introduce nondeterminism among generative
actions. Instead, parameter p is not used when hiding generative actions (like in
Example 2), since the choice among generative actions is already probabilistic.
Here, we do not detail the semantics of such an operator when hiding reactive
actions, since this particular case does not arise in our case study.
In the rest of the paper we use the following abbreviations. We assume pa-
rameter p to be equal to 1
2 whenever it is omitted from any probabilistic operator.Moreover, when it is clear from the context, we use the abbreviation P=S, with
S = fa1;:::;ang µ AType, to denote the expression P=a1:::an = P=a1 :::=an.
3.2 Security Analysis
Unauthorized disclosure of information in multi-level security systems can be re-
vealed by verifying whether the several components of the system fail to protect
a conﬁdential, high-level information by leaking it to a public, unclassiﬁed, low-
level user. Nondeterministic approaches to the information ﬂow theory analyze
such a kind of interference by studying the eﬀect of the conﬁdential activities
on the public view of the system behavior (see, e.g., [McL90,FG95]). Anyway,
two main problems arise when considering an approach based on pure nonde-
terminism. On the one hand, such a binary, qualitative notion of information
leakage turns out to be too restrictive in several real systems, where high level
interferes with low level all the time [RMMG01] and the eﬀort of the designer
consists of minimizing such a kind of undesirable interactions. On the other hand,
the analysis of nondeterministic security properties is not appropriate to reveal
those interferences that are not solely nondeterministic, since they may depend
on additional information, like probabilities and time [Gra92]. Along this line,
in [ABG02] we have proposed a probabilistic extension to the nondeterminis-
tic information ﬂow theory of [FG95] based on the probabilistic process algebra
surveyed above, which is intended to:
– capture those information ﬂows which are not observable in a purely nonde-
terministic setting;
– deal with the general case where the tolerance for information leakage is
given by a quantitative estimate expressed by probabilistic measures.
The analysis of a given security property, say SP, in a process algebraic
setting roughly consists of:
1. deriving two models from the algebraic speciﬁcation of the system at hand;
2. checking the semantic equivalence between such derived models.
The deﬁnition of the submodels to be compared depends on the deﬁnition
of SP. One of the most intuitive properties described in [ABG02] is the Proba-
bilistic Bisimulation Nondeducibility on Composition property (PBNDC), which
informally says that the probabilistic low-level view of a system P in isolation is
not to be altered when considering the potential interactions of P with the high-
level activities oﬀered by the external environment. The deﬁnition of PBNDC
is formalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. P 2 PBNDC if and only if
PnATypeH ¼PB ((P k
p
fh1;:::;hng ¦)=
q1
h1 :::=
qn
hn)nATypeH
8 p;q1;:::;qn 2]0;1[, 8fh1;:::;hng µ ATypeH, and 8 high-level process ¦.Term PnATypeH, where the high-level actions are prevented, models the low-
level behavior of the system P in isolation, i.e. without high-level interactions
with the environment. Term ((P k
p
fh1;:::;hng ¦)=
q1
h1 :::=
qn
hn)nATypeH models, from
the low-level standpoint, the behavior of P when interacting, through the com-
munication interface fh1;:::;hng, with the high-level activities oﬀered by the
external environment, represented by any process ¦ (enabling high-level actions
only) put in parallel with P. Finally, ¼PB is the equivalence relation, called
weak probabilistic bisimulation [ABG02], which is a probabilistic version (in-
spired by [BH97]) of the classical weak bisimulation of [Mil89]. If the two views
of the system are indistinguishable from the standpoint of an external observer
that can access the low-level part only, then no unwanted information leakage
occurs and the system is considered to be secure.
3.3 Performance Analysis
As far as the temporal aspect is concerned, we now describe an interpretation of
the probabilistic process algebra in the context of discrete time [Bra02,BA03],
i.e. where time is represented by a sequence of discrete steps, like in Discrete
Time Markov Chains (DTMCs), and the duration of each step is given by a
ﬁxed time unit. In such a framework, the parallel composition operator we adopt
allows (i) processes with diﬀerent probabilistic advancing speeds (mean number
of actions executed per time unit) to be modeled, and (ii) several processes based
on diﬀerent time units to be composed in parallel by preserving their temporal
behavior.
In our discrete time setting, P k
p
S Q models a system where p (1 ¡ p) is the
probabilistic advancing speed of P (Q), i.e., at each system state a probabilistic
scheduler schedules for execution an action of P with probability p and an action
of Q with probability 1 ¡ p. Now, on the basis of the mean action frequency or,
in other words, of the time unit adopted by each process in isolation, we can
adequately calculate a global time unit for the composed model and a suitable
probabilistic parameter for the parallel operator in such a way that each process
preserves its mean action frequency. More precisely, P k
p
S Q can be interpreted as
being a description of the actual concurrent execution of two processes P and Q
speciﬁed with respect to diﬀerent action durations. This is done as follows. If fP
is the mean action frequency in process P (i.e. each action takes time 1=fP on
average to be executed) and fQ is the mean action frequency in process Q, the
mean action frequency of the parallel composition of P and Q is f = fP + fQ.
Therefore, the time unit for P k
p
S Q is u = 1=(fP +fQ). Now, given that p is the
probabilistic advancing speed of P, the mean action frequency of P with respect
to u is given by p=u = p ¢ f. Therefore, if we take p = fP=f = fP=(fP + fQ), it
follows that the mean action frequency of P within P k
p
S Q is fP. Similarly, the
action frequency 1 ¡ p of Q with respect to u is 1 ¡ p = fQ=f = fQ=(fP + fQ).
Such an approach holds under the restriction that in each system state reach-
able from P k
p
S Q, a probabilistic choice between P and Q guided by parameter
p is to be performed. Then, from the labeled transition system associated to a
fully speciﬁed process (i.e., not enabling nondeterministic choices), we can derivea DTMC (by discarding types from transition labels), on which we can apply
standard techniques to evaluate performance measures of interest. Finally, we
point out that if we are interested in evaluating steady state based performance
measures (which are expressible by attaching rewards to actions), the approach
described above provides an exact solution even if the advancing speeds are
considered to be exact instead of probabilistic [BA03].
As we will show in the next section, we employ such an approach to model
the temporal behavior of each component of the audio protocol speciﬁcation.
4 Performance and Security Analyses of BoAT
In a previous work [ABGR01] we conducted a simulative analysis on an alge-
braic speciﬁcation of BoAT (based on the process algebra EMPAgr [Ber99]) to
get some performance measures related to the QoS oﬀered by the adaptive play-
out control algorithm. The reason for resorting to EMPAgr was its expressive
power given by a set of features, such as probabilities, priorities, and value-
passing. However, the results of such an analysis were limited to the functional
and performance properties of BoAT. In this section, we employ the approach
described in Sect. 3 in order to formally evaluate also the security level of BoAT.
4.1 The Algebraic Speciﬁcation of BoAT
In this section, we introduce the algebraic speciﬁcation of BoAT based on the
calculus presented in Sect. 3. To this aim, we resort to the following assumptions.
Since all packets are encrypted with secret keys that are not known by external
parties, we abstract away from the cryptosystem used within the protocol and
we just model the packet exchange. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we take
into consideration the half-duplex part of the communication during which the
so-called sender talks and the so-called receiver listens.
In Table 1 we show the model of a sender which repeatedly transmits audio
packets and periodically performs the three-way handshaking protocol1. Process
Sen models the situation in which a new handshaking phase is to be started:
the output action prepare packet expresses the transmission of an audio packet,
the output action prepare probe represents the transmission of the ﬁrst message
of the handshaking phase, and the output action idle S denotes the inactivity
periods of the sender during which no packets are sent out, e.g. due to a tem-
porary overloaded channel. As far as the reactive behavior is concerned, process
Sen is ready to accept messages coming from the receiving site. Since we just
model the part of the communication during which the sender talks and the
receiver listens, the only messages originated by the receiving site can be those
related to the handshaking protocol, i.e. response messages and ack messages. In
particular, in process Sen the reception of a response message, modeled by the
1 We will discuss the values of the parameters associated to the operators in the next
section, where we will consider the temporal behavior of the system.Table 1. BoAT – Model of the sending site
Sen
¢ = ((prepare packet:Sen +
0:96 prepare probe:Sen
0) +
idle S:Sen) + (trans response¤:Sen + ignore ack¤:Sen)
Sen
0 ¢ = ((prepare packet:Sen
0 +
0:96 prepare probe:Sen
0) +
idle S:Sen
0) + (trans response¤:Sen
00 + ignore ack¤:Sen
0)
Sen
00 ¢ = (((prepare packet:Sen
00 +
in prepare install:Sen
000) +
0:96
prepare probe:Sen
0) + idle S:Sen
00) +
(trans response¤:Sen
00 + ignore ack¤:Sen
00)
Sen
000 ¢ = ((¿:Sen
000 +
s prepare packet:Sen
0000) +
0:96
prepare probe:Sen
0) + (trans response¤:Sen
000 + trans ack¤:Sen)
Sen
0000 ¢ = ((prepare packet:Sen
0000 +
0:96 prepare probe:Sen
0) +
idle S:Sen
0000) + (trans response¤:Sen
0000 + trans ack¤:Sen)
input action trans response¤, refers to an old unsuccessful handshaking phase.
Therefore, it is simply ignored (note that the action of type trans response does
not cause a change of state). Similarly, in process Sen, ack packets related to
previous synchronization protocols are not expected to be received. In this case,
we model the reception of an ack message via the input action of type ignore ack,
which denotes an ack packet received and discarded by the sender (i.e., related
to a failed synchronization). In case of successful completion of the handshaking
protocol, we will use the action type trans ack. The motivation for such an ex-
plicit distinction is that we will be interested in quantifying failed and successful
handshaking phases.
When a new probe message is transmitted, the sender waits for a response
message from the receiver in term Sen0. Note that, in each term of the sender
model, we allow a new synchronization phase to be started via the execution of
the action prepare probe, which leads to term Sen0, since the original audio proto-
col discards those handshaking phases that (i) are not completed within a second
(e.g. due to sudden spikes in end-to-end delays), and (ii) are deadlocked because
of some lost handshaking packets. With respect to term Sen, in term Sen0 the
reception of a response message through the input action trans response¤ ex-
presses the completion of the ﬁrst step of the handshaking protocol after which
the sender prepares an install packet to be sent in term Sen00.
After the execution of the action prepare install, the sender waits for the
ﬁnal ack from the receiver in term Sen000. Since usually the install packet is sent
during a silence period, term Sen000 models the inactivity phase of the sender
by repeatedly executing an internal action ¿. Alternatively, the execution of the
action prepare packet, which leads to term Sen0000, represents the termination of
the idle period and the beginning of a new talkspurt. For both terms Sen000 and
Sen0000 the execution of the action trans ack represents the ﬁnal step of a three-way handshake completed with success, whose eﬀect is that the initial state Sen
is reached again.
We now describe a (possible) model for the receiver and for the channel (see
Table 2). As far as the network is concerned, since we concentrate on the half-
duplex audio communication between the sender and the receiver, we explicitly
model the channel that transmits packets from the sending site to the receiving
site. Instead, the packets originated by the receiver and destined to the sender
are directly passed between these two terms, so that we abstract away from the
related channel.
Term Ch is a fully reactive process modeling a perfect channel that does not
lose packets and is always ready to accept packets originated by the sender. The
action idle R¤ is enabled to inform the receiver that currently no packet is ready
to be delivered. Once a packet is transmitted from the sender to the channel,
term Ch passes the control to one of terms For packet, For probe, or For install,
which are in charge of forwarding the packet to the receiver. In each of these
terms, the channel is not ready to accept further packets from the sender, so
that the action idle S¤ is enabled to inform the sender of such a situation.
Term Rec models a receiver that either is idle (and repeatedly executes action
idle R) or accepts any arriving packet. If a handshaking packet is delivered,
term Rec passes the control to one of the following terms: term Rec0 transmits a
response message in case a probe packet has been received; term Rec00 transmits
an ack message in case an install packet has been received.
Finally, in Table 2 we also report the overall system BoAT, expressing the
parallel execution of the three models speciﬁed so far, together with the related
communication interfaces.
4.2 Security Analysis of BoAT
From a security standpoint, we want to verify if the handshaking protocol (which
is the core of the securing mechanism of BoAT) is robust against external attacks.
To this aim, in order to apply the methodology described in Sect. 3 we have to
single out the high-level actions and the low-level ones, so that the high and low
behaviors of the system can be speciﬁed.
According to an approach proposed in [FGM00] for the analysis of nonin-
terference properties of cryptographic protocols, the high level expresses the
external, possibly dishonest environment, where the intruders act in order to in-
terfere with the activities of the protocol. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that
all actions that are used to model the protocol, which interacts with the environ-
ment, are high-level actions. Instead, the low-level actions are extra observable
actions that we include into the protocol speciﬁcation in order to observe the
properties of the protocol itself.
In the context of our case study, we have to add some low-level actions that
allow an external low-level observer to analyze the behavior of the three-way
handshake, that is the core of the protocol under analysis. We point out that
the successful execution of a handshaking phase starts with the transmission of a
probe message and terminates with the reception of an ack message. Therefore,Table 2. BoAT – Model of a perfect channel and of the receiving site
Ch
¢ = prepare packet¤:For packet +
prepare probe¤:For probe +
prepare install¤:For install +
idle R¤:Ch
For packet
¢ = trans packet¤:Ch + idle S¤:For packet
For probe
¢ = trans probe¤:Ch + idle S¤:For probe
For install
¢ = trans install¤:Ch + idle S¤:For install
Rec
¢ = (trans probe:Rec
0 + trans install:Rec
00) +
(trans packet:Rec + idle R:Rec)
Rec
0 ¢ = trans response:Rec
Rec
00 ¢ = trans ack:Rec + ignore ack:Rec
BoAT
¢ = Sen k
p
S(Ch kR Rec)
S
¢ = fprepare packet; prepare probe; prepare install;
trans response; trans ack; ignore ack; idle Sg
R
¢ = ftrans packet; trans probe; trans install; idle Rg
if we include in the sender model a low-level action init synch immediately
after the execution of each action of type prepare probe, and a low-level action
end synch immediately after the execution of each action of type trans ack, a
low-level observer may infer the result of any handshaking phase and potentially
realize that an adversary is trying to interfere with the synchronization policy.
As an example, term Sen of Table 1 should be changed as follows (similarly for
the other ones):
Sen
¢ = ((prepare packet:Sen +0:96 prepare probe:init synch:Sen0) +
idle S:Sen) + (trans response¤:Sen + ignore ack¤:Sen):
In the following, we denote by Senl the sender model enriched with the low-
level actions as speciﬁed above. Now, we are ready to apply the methodology
described in Sect. 3 for the security analysis of BoAT. Since we are assuming that
both participants have been previously authenticated, potential interferences
may come from the channel only. Therefore, the security property we intend to
check can be informally deﬁned as follows.
BoAT is secure if and only if the execution of the protocol without exter-
nal interferences is invariant with respect to the execution of the protocol in an
untrusted channel possibly under the control of the adversary.
On the one hand, we observe that term BoAT of Table 2 expresses the
execution of the protocol without interferences. Indeed, we recall that term Ch ofTable 2 models a perfect, private channel with no intruders. Therefore, it follows
that the low-level view of the system in the sense speciﬁed above is expressed
by term BoATl
¢ = (Senl k
p
S(Ch kR Rec))=(S[R), where all the high-level actions
denoting the protocol activities are hidden.
On the other hand, if we assume that the network is under the control of the
adversary, then we have to consider the system for any model of the communi-
cation channel, which may include external attacks. Therefore, we can formalize
the security property in a PBNDC style as follows2:
BoATlnATypeH ¼PB ((Senl k
q
S(Ch0 k
q
0
R Rec))=p
s¢r)nATypeH
8q;q0 2]0;1[; 8p 2 Seq
jS[Rj
]0;1[ and 8 high-level process Ch0.
The formula above says that the low-level view of BoATl in isolation is to be
the same as that observed when the sender and the receiver perform their proto-
col steps by transmitting their packets over an untrusted (potentially controlled
by the adversary) channel (modeled by any high-level term Ch0, which may in-
clude dishonest strategies). Note that in BoATlnATypeH the ﬁnal restriction on
the set ATypeH is redundant, since in term BoATl the high-level actions are
either hidden (if they result from a synchronization) or restricted by the parallel
operators (if they cannot synchronize).
The low view of term BoATl consists of a sequence of actions end synch,
each one preceded by at least one action init synch. This correctly represents
the expected behavior of BoAT, which periodically starts a new handshaking
phase (denoted by action init synch) and each of these phases may be com-
pleted with success (denoted by action end synch).
If we take into consideration only the possible behaviors of the system3, then
the low behavior of BoAT is not altered if we consider intruders that interfere
by capturing some of the transmitted packets (replace, e.g., term Ch0 by term
Ch lossy of Table 3). In fact, even if an adversary blocks some handshaking pack-
ets, the observable low-level view is given by a sequence of actions end synch,
each one preceded by at least one action init synch. On the other hand, it is easy
to see that a denial-of-service attack conducted by an adversary (which eaves-
drops the channel and discards each transmitted packet – consider, e.g., term
Ch blind of Table 3) is the only kind of attack that is responsible for altering
the expected low view of the system. In fact, in such a case, the low-level action
end synch is never enabled. However, if we take into consideration the proba-
bilistic information, we observe that the probability of observing the successful
handshakes (with respect to those that fail) depends on the probabilistic be-
havior of the intruder. For instance, if the considered channel is term Ch lossy
of Table 3, then the probability of observing the low-level action end synch
2 Given S µ AType, s denotes the sequence, in alphabetic order, of types contained in
S, while s ¢ s
0 denotes the catenation of the two sequences s and s
0; we also denote
by Seq
k
D the set of k-length sequences with domain D.
3 We can apply the noninterference theory for nondeterministic processes if we ignore
the probabilistic information reported in the algebraic speciﬁcation of BoAT.Table 3. Some models of possible channels
Ch lossy
¢ = (prepare packet¤:Ch lossy +
da prepare packet¤:For packet) +
((prepare probe¤:Ch lossy +
dp prepare probe¤:For probe) +
(prepare install¤:Ch lossy +
di prepare install¤:For install)) +
idle R¤:Ch lossy
For packet
¢ = trans packet¤:Ch lossy + idle S¤:For packet
For probe
¢ = trans probe¤:Ch lossy + idle S¤:For probe
For install
¢ = trans install¤:Ch lossy + idle S¤:For install
Ch blind
¢ = ((prepare packet¤:Ch blind + prepare probe¤:Ch blind) +
(prepare install¤:Ch blind + idle R¤:Ch blind))
depends on parameters da, dp, and di, which probabilistically model the loss
percentage of audio packets, probe packets, and install packets, respectively.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that BoAT does not satisfy the
security property. Now, we are interested in estimating how the security level of
BoAT is aﬀected by the adversary strategy. More precisely, we want to evaluate
if the honest participants are able to detect any external attack and how to
behave in such a case. To this aim, we pass to the performance model of BoAT
in order to derive performance measures of interest.
4.3 Mixed Performance/Security Analysis of BoAT
Before introducing the performance model of BoAT, we specify the kind of attack
whose eﬀects we are interested in evaluating. Since we concentrate on the half-
duplex part of the audio communication from the sender to the receiver, we take
into consideration all possible attacks performed by an adversary that eavesdrops
(and possibly captures) the packets generated by the sending site. Moreover, we
consider the preliminary authentication phase preceding the audio conversation
as a secure step. Therefore, since all packets are enriched with timestamps and
encrypted with secret keys, we consider forgery, authentication and replication
attacks by any external party as not meaningful. Instead, an adversary can try
to conduct a cryptanalysis attack in order to compromize the privacy of the
conversation. Since the secrecy level of BoAT trusts on the short duration of
each session key (about a second of conversation, i.e. the time between two
consecutive handshaking phases), and the robustness of the stream cipher used
by BoAT may depend on the quantity of data encrypted with the same key (see,
e.g., [BSW00]), then the probability of cracking a session key increases if several
consecutive handshaking protocols fail, because in such a case the same key is
used to encrypt several seconds of conversation. With this in view, a strategy
for a dishonest adversary consists of intercepting and blocking the packets ofthe handshaking protocol, in order to weaken the secrecy condition of BoAT by
extending the lifetime of each session key.
In the previous section, we have described a model of the channel (see the
fully reactive term Ch lossy of Table 3) that expresses such a kind of attack.
More precisely, it is easy to verify that, from the viewpoint of a low-level external
observer, the probabilistic behavior of term Ch lossy (expressed by parameters
da, dp, and di only) within the overall system is responsible for aﬀecting the
probability distribution of the successful handshakes. In this section, we quan-
tify the diﬀerence between the behavior of the system without intruders and
the behavior of the system under the attack speciﬁed by term Ch lossy. To
this end, we ﬁrst pass to a performance model by considering the temporal be-
havior of processes Sen and Rec, and then we analyze the composed system
((Sen k
p
S(Ch lossy kR Rec))=(S [ R))nATypeH, by varying the probabilistic be-
havior of term Ch lossy. Note that the two limiting scenarios are represented
by (i) the channel that blocks all the transmitted packets (see term Ch blind of
Table 3), and (ii) the channel that forwards each transmitted packet (see term
Ch of Table 2). The goal of our analysis is the evaluation of the throughput of
the handshaking protocol (i.e. the mean number of handshakes completed with
success per time unit) for each adversary strategy between the two limiting sce-
narios. In the following, we show how to model the temporal behavior of each
component according to the features of BoAT speciﬁed in [ABGR01,RGPSB01].
As far as the sender model is concerned, we consider a sending site that
produces 25 audio packets per sec. To this end, the time unit we adopt for
process Sen is 40 ms, i.e. each action of term Sen takes 40 ms on average to be
executed or, equivalently, the mean action frequency of term Sen is 25 actions per
sec. Moreover, we assume that the time between two consecutive handshaking
phases is about 1 sec. The probabilistic parameters shown in Table 1 exactly
reﬂect such temporal assumptions. In particular, since action prepare probe has
to be executed once a second on average and the mean action frequency for
process Sen is 25 actions per sec, in each discrete step the action to be executed is
prepare probe with probability 1=25 = 0:04 and prepare packet with probability
1 ¡ 0:04 = 0:96. If such actions are enabled in the composed system, then the
action idle S is not; on the contrary, if such actions are not enabled, then the
action idle S is performed with probability 1.
In term Sen00, the probability 0:96 of sending a packet diﬀerent from a probe
message has to be distributed between the two possible events: the transmission
of either an audio packet or an install message. Since the install message is
not sent as soon as the response message is received, but only during a silence
period, we employ parameter in to express the probability of executing the
action prepare packet with respect to the action prepare install. In practice,
as parameter in increases, the probability of being in a talkspurt increases as
well. Since experimental studies show that the duration of a silence period is
about the 30% of the duration of a talkspurt [HSK98,ABGR01], in the following
we assume in = 0:7, meaning that the probability of transmitting the install
message (instead of an audio packet) is equal to 30%.In term Sen000, parameter s expresses the probability of being in a silence pe-
riod between two consecutive talkspurts. More precisely, the duration of the in-
activity phase of the sender is probabilistically modeled according to a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter s: the sender either stays in its idle period with prob-
ability s¢0:96 or starts a new talkspurt with probability (1¡s)¢0:96. If the sender
is not allowed to send packets (i.e. actions prepare packet and prepare probe are
not enabled), the action ¿ expressing the idling period is executed with proba-
bility 1. As far as the experimental scenario is concerned, we assume s = 0:7,
namely in term Sen000 we start a new talkspurt (instead of staying idle) with
probability 30%.
As far as the receiving site is concerned, the time unit adopted for term Rec
is 1 ms, i.e. each action of term Rec takes 1 ms on average to be executed or,
equivalently, the mean action frequency of term Rec is 1000 actions per sec. This
choice expresses the fact that the receiving site is always ready to accept packets
and, if necessary, to immediately send back a handshaking packet.
As far as the overall system is concerned, we now compute the global time
unit u and the parameters of the probabilistic parallel operators for the composed
system ((Sen k
p
S(Ch lossy kR Rec))=(S [R))nATypeH. The global time unit u is
the inverse of the global action frequency of the composed system, which in turn
is equal to 25 (i.e., the action frequency of term Sen) + 1000 (see term Rec)
= 1025 actions per sec. Note that the process modeling the channel is completely
reactive (that means we abstract away from the transmission delays experienced
along the channel), so that it does not express a process with its own advancing
speed. Moreover, we also have that in each system state both processes Sen
and Rec can execute at least a generative action. Hence, parameter p represents
the advancing speed of term Sen within the overall system and is given by the
ratio of the action frequency of term Sen over the global action frequency of the
composed system, i.e. p = 25=1025 ¼ 0:02439.
From the algebraic speciﬁcation of the composed system we can derive a
DTMC, since the related labeled transition system is fully speciﬁed in the sense
that all the choices are fully probabilistic or, in other words, reactive actions
are never enabled. Therefore, in order to obtain steady state based performance
measures, we adequately attach rewards to actions and we analyze the related
DTMC. To this end, we resorted to the software tool TwoTowers [BCSS98],
which has been extended to support the generative-reactive approach of our
probabilistic calculus. Such a tool also implements the algebraic reward based
method needed to specify and derive performance measures. On the one hand,
we evaluate the throughput of the handshaking protocol at the sending site, i.e.
the number of handshaking phases completed with success, expressed in terms
of occurrences of actions of type trans ack. This is done by attaching a reward
equal to 1 to the action trans ack and a reward equal to 0 to each other action.
On the other hand, we also evaluate the throughput for the receiver, i.e. the
number of audio packets arrived at the receiving site, in terms of occurrences
of actions of type trans packet, by attaching a reward equal to 1 to the above
action and a reward equal to 0 to each other action.The performance results we are going to present have been obtained by vary-
ing the probabilistic behavior of the channel model. As we have shown, an adver-
sary that is interested in extending the lifetime of each session key tries to inter-
cept and discard the handshaking packets. Given that all packets are encrypted,
an adversary cannot distinguish the audio packets from the handshaking packets
originated by the sender. Hence, in a ﬁrst scenario we assume that an intruder
can just try to randomly discard some of the transmitted packets. In particular,
we vary from 0% to 100% the percentage of packets captured and blocked along
the channel by the dishonest intruder. The extreme value 0% corresponds to the
behavior modeled by term Ch of Table 2, while the extreme value 100% corre-
sponds to the behavior modeled by term Ch blind of Table 3. For each other
value, we consider term Ch lossy and, by assuming da = dp = di (expressing
the probability of discarding audio, probe, and install packets, respectively), we
vary such parameters from 0 to 1.
In Fig. 3 we show the tradeoﬀ between the percentage of packets discarded
by an adversary that eavesdrops the channel and the throughput at the sending
site in terms of occurrences of actions of type trans ack, which expresses the
completion with success of the handshaking phase. As an expected result, the
number of synchronizations completed in a second decreases as the percentage
of lost packets tends to 1. In particular, in case of a perfect and private channel,
the audio protocol completes about 0:866 handshaking phases per sec. For a loss
rate less than 10% such a throughput is still tolerable (greater than 0:7 phases
completed per sec), but as the loss rate increases (20% and more) the throughput
rapidly converges under 0:5 phases completed per sec, i.e. less than one synchro-
nization every 2 sec. In particular, in Fig. 3 we also show the tolerable area
beyond which the number of successful synchronizations is so low that (i) the
estimated playout delay cannot represent an accurate evaluation of the current
state of the channel [HSK98,RGPSB01], and (ii) the lifetime of each session key
is noticeably greater than 1 sec. The main result that we derive from such an ex-
periment is that the probabilistic behavior of the environment (adversary) aﬀects
the throughput of the three-way handshake protocol as measured by the sender.
Similarly, we can infer the eﬀect of the adversary behavior on the receiving site.
In Fig. 4 we show the tradeoﬀ between the percentage of packets discarded by an
adversary that eavesdrops the channel and the throughput at the receiving site
in terms of occurrences of actions of type trans packet. Once again, the num-
ber of packets received in a second decreases as the percentage of lost packets
tends to 1. In Fig. 4 we also report the area denoting the performance that is
desired by the authenticated parties, in the sense that beyond such an area (i.e.,
for loss rates greater than 10%) the quality of the perceived audio dramatically
jeopardizes the comprehension of the conversation [RGPSB01,ABGR01].
The analysis conducted above clearly shows that each change in the proba-
bilistic behavior of the (hostile) environment is reﬂected upon the performance
behavior of BoAT as measured by the honest participants. Such an informa-
tion can be exploited in order to quantify the risk for the encrypted data to be
cracked by a dishonest third party. By comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 we observetrans_ack
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Fig.4. Audio packet throughput at the receiving sitethat an intruder that captures packets in a random way aﬀects the performance
of both audio packet throughput at the receiving site and handshaking through-
put at the sending site. If the behavior of the intruder makes both throughputs
come out from the tolerable area, the honest participants decide to cut oﬀ the
communication due to the scarce QoS. If this is not the case, the throughputs
maintain high values and, as a consequence, both audio quality and data secrecy
are not compromized.
A more interesting result can be obtained by dealing with a clever adversary
that somehow is able to intercept the handshaking packets transmitted by the
sender. If this is the case, the intruder attack can make the throughput of the
handshaking protocol decreased, without substantially altering the audio packet
throughput at the receiving site. For instance, an adversary may try to exploit
the fact that the install packet is sent during a silence period in order to inter-
cept and block such a handshaking packet. However, this attack can be easily
avoided by a sender that generates and transmits encrypted dummy packets
during the silence phases between consecutive talkspurts, so that the adversary
cannot detect the install packet. Alternatively, an intruder may try to guess the
instant in which the probe packet is transmitted by the sender. Such a strategy
can cause serious damage to the security level of the audio protocol if exactly 1
sec passes between the transmission of two consecutive probe messages, as in the
original proposal of BoAT. Indeed, by assuming such a behavior of the sending
site, the intruder can get a good approximation of the transmission time of the
probe messages by eavesdropping the conversation from the beginning.
With this in view, here we evaluate the trade-oﬀ between the throughput of
the synchronization protocol and the capability of the intruder of guessing the
probe packets. To this end, we make the following assumptions. Supposed that
the ith handshaking phase starts approximately i sec after the beginning of the
conversation, we assume the instant of the transmission of the related probe mes-
sage to follow a gaussian distribution with mean value i and standard deviation
dev. By varying parameter dev and by ﬁxing the width of the temporal interval
around time i within which the intruder discards all the transmitted packets, we
employ the normal distribution tables [Bey90] to measure the probability for the
intruder of stopping exactly the probe message (such a probability is assigned to
parameter dp of term Ch lossy of the algebraic speciﬁcation). In a ﬁrst scenario,
we assume that the intruder discards 5 packets transmitted around time i, by
covering a time interval of 160 ms. If one of them is the probe packet, then the
percentage of lost audio packets (modeled by parameter da) is 16%. In a second
scenario, we assume that the intruder discards 3 packets only, by covering a time
interval of 80 ms. This corresponds to da = 8%. Finally, parameter di, which
models the percentage of lost install packets, is set to 0, because the transmission
instant of such a packet is out of the time interval within which the adversary
captures packets.
In Fig. 5, we show the results that derive from the analysis of the BoAT
speciﬁcation where the term modeling the channel is changed according to the
behavior above. We point out that the throughput of the handshaking protocol 0
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Fig.5. Trade-oﬀ between handshaking protocol throughput and intruder strategy
is computed exactly as explained in case of Fig. 3. The curves are obtained by
varying the probability for the intruder of guessing the probe message according
to diﬀerent values of parameter dev, which varies from 25 to 400 ms. A low
value of the standard deviation dev means that the approximation made by
the intruder is accurate with high probability, because the ith probe packet is
indeed transmitted around time i, while a high value of dev means that the
intruder has a lower chance of guessing the probe message. Hence, by increasing
parameter dev the throughput of the handshaking protocol tends to its limiting
value 0:866, which represents the case in which no packets are stopped by the
intruder. In the ﬁrst scenario, i.e. when the intruder discards 5 packets per sec,
we observe that for a standard deviation dev less than 100 ms, the throughput of
the handshaking protocol rapidly converges to values corresponding to a lifetime
of each session key noticeably greater than 5 sec (instead of 1 sec as expected
by the protocol), which in many cases is more than enough to crack the session
key and the encrypted data (see, e.g., [BSW00]). Anyway, in such a scenario we
also have that the audio packet loss measured at the receiving site is about 16%,
which represents a limiting performance typical of highly overloaded channels.
Therefore, the audio communication will be likely terminated by the participants
because of such a poor QoS. Instead, in the second scenario, i.e. when the intruder
discards 3 packets per sec, the audio packet loss measured at the receiving site
is about 8%, which is a performance acceptable by the honest participants. In
spite of this, a clever intruder can reduce the throughput of the handshaking
protocol up to about 0:096 and, even in case of parameter dev equal to 50 ms,
the lifetime of each session key is about three times the expected value.
The unwanted behavior described above can be avoided by implementing a
version of BoAT proposed in [AGR01], which suggests to vary, during the conver-
sation lifetime, the time interval between two consecutive handshaking phases.
More precisely, in order to make diﬃcult for the intruder a precise evaluation
of the time instant in which the probe message is sent, we introduce a random
factor in the computation of such a time instant. To this end, we can employ the
results of the formal analysis conducted above in order to evaluate the relation-ship between the choice of such a random factor and the number of expected
successful handshaking phases. In particular, instead of sending the ith probe
message exactly i sec after the beginning of the conversation, we could decide to
send such a packet at a time instant sampled according to a gaussian distribu-
tion with mean value i and standard deviation dev. The choice of parameter dev
aﬀects the handshaking protocol throughput and, as a consequence, the lifetime
of each session key and the secrecy level of the audio protocol. By following the
results depicted in Fig. 5, it is easy to see that a value of parameter dev greater
than 200 ms is more than enough to guarantee a throughput of the handshaking
protocol that falls in the tolerable area put in evidence in Fig. 3, independently
of the behavior of any clever intruder.
The mixed security/performance analysis revealed that an attack that aims
at weakening the session keys can be easily prevented by changing the algo-
rithm followed by the sending site to originate the probe messages. We conclude
by observing that the eﬀectiveness of such an attack and the related counter-
move cannot be viewed if we just employ a nondeterministic approach to the
information ﬂow theory. This is because in a nondeterministic setting we can
reveal a denial-of-service attack only, while we have seen that the analysis of the
performance behavior of BoAT is needed to give a quantitative estimate of the
capability of a probabilistic adversary of compromizing the secrecy level of the
audio communication.
5 Conclusion
We conclude by summarizing the two main results presented in this paper. On the
one hand, we have emphasized that a nondeterministic approach is not enough
to analyze the security level of real systems for which a quantitative estimate of
the unwanted information ﬂows is more signiﬁcant. On the other hand, we have
seen that performance behavior and security level can be tightly connected. To
formally evaluate such a relation, an approach that allows both aspects to be
described and analyzed on the same model is needed.
Finally, it is worth noting that in this paper we have considered a secrecy
property whose analysis should help the modeler to reveal unwanted conditions
in which cryptanalysis attacks can be successfully completed. We did not explic-
itly modeled the weaknesses of the keys by evaluating, e.g., the probability of
guessing a message encrypted through a session key with a certain lifetime. To
do this, we intend to extend our process algebraic approach in order to deal with
cryptographic operations and imperfect cryptography.
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